



The adoption of Section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of
Torts in 1965 is commonly viewed as initiating a revolution in the law
of torts. Obviously, Section 402A's standard of strict liability for de-
fective and unreasonably dangerous products transformed the field of
products liability from a minor adjunct of warranty law into an enor-
mous source of modern litigation. But the transformation of law oc-
casioned by the adoption of the strict liability approach has been
broader. It is common to regard Section 402A as having shifted the
basis of American tort law altogether from the modest concerns of
corrective justice toward the far bolder objectives of regulating safety
and providing widespread compensation. In the United States before
the Section 402A revolution, and in common law countries without
some version of Section 402A today, tort law serves chiefly to restore
some relationship between parties that has been upset through mor-
ally negligent behavior.' Since the Section 402A revolution in the
United States, in contrast, tort law has become .the dominant modern
policy instrument for regulating harm-causing activities and provid-
ing compensation to the injured.
The dimensions of this conceptual revolution in tort law should
not be underestimated. Throughout its history, the United States has
regarded direct regulation of industrial activities with suspicion, limit-
ing regulatory intervention to a narrow set of industries, most com-
monly those dominated by natural monopoly. Yet today, after the
tort law revolution of the mid-1960s, courts employ civil damage
judgments to establish fine-tuned incentives to control the accident
rate by internalizing injury costs to every product manufacturer and
every service provider.
The influence of the tort law revolution of the 1960s on compen-
sation goals has been equally dramatic. The United States has never
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adopted the society-wide injury compensation systems common to
most other Western industrialized nations. Yet, following the tort
law revolution, courts aspire to use the civil justice system to provide
compensation broadly to injured persons. Moreover, over the past
decade, social welfare benefits in the United States have been largely
frozen and in some cases diminished. In contrast, since the tort law
revolution, United States courts have employed damage judgments to
provide compensation insurance for the injured at benefit levels that
vastly exceed current social welfare levels in the United States as well
as the benefit. levels of any other Western nation.
That a revolution occurred in tort law since the mid-1960s is not
in doubt. What has remained mysterious, however, is the means by
which this revolution occurred. It is obvious that there were impor-
tant intellectual advocates of conceptual changes in tort law prior to
the Restatement effort.2 Legal scholars had promoted the expansion
of tort law on deterrence and risk distribution grounds for decades,
and before 1960 these scholarly approaches began to command in-
creasing. support.
The mystery derives from the lack of explanation of how these
academic views could be translated so rapidly and thoroughly into
public policy. Most puzzling is that this new conception of tort law
was first introduced by the very conservative American Law Institute
and then implemented by state supreme court judges who were proba-
bly among the most conservative members of the legal community.
Support for a conceptual revolution among academics is not unusual;
many academics strive to make reputations by claiming to be visiona-
ries. But there is little return to revolution for members of the judici-
ary. And lawmaking by the American Law Institute, as the term for
its projects-"Restatements"-suggests, has seldom aspired to the
radical overturn of 300 years of civil jurisprudence that occurred in
tort law.
This Paper attempts to explain these developments. It attempts
to describe how the adoption of Section 402A simultaneously could be
consistent with the conservatism of the American Law Institute and
the American state judiciary and yet set the stage for the radical
revolution in tort law that followed. It is well-known that the drafters
of Section 402A (the founders of our modern tort regime) claimed
2 See, e.g., Ehrenzweig, Products Liability in the Conflict of Laws-Toward a Theory of
Enterprise Liability Under 'Foreseeable and Insurable Laws,' 69 Yale L.J. 794 (1960); James,
Accident Liability: Some Wartime Developments, 55 Yale L.J. 365 (1946). See also the discus-
sion in Priest, The Invention of Enterprise Liability: A Critical History of the Intellectual
Foundations of Modern Tort Law, 14 J. Legal Stud. 461 (1985).
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that the Section introduced only a modest expansion of then-current
warranty law.3 Given the subsequent explosion in products liability,
this claim of the founders has appeared either disingenuous or, to less
skeptical readers, simply baffling.
This Paper tries to explain the founders' views. The Paper ar-
gues that the founders did not anticipate that the changes in the law
introduced by Section 402A would initiate a revolution in tort juris-
prudence. The founders believed that these changes would apply to
only a small set of cases. For these cases, Section 402A would sim-
plify recovery-though not dramatically increase the chances of re-
covery-by eliminating various technical defenses in warranty law.
Strict liability would provide a simpler and more direct method of
addressing these cases, but would not constitute a major substantive
shift in the controlling standard of law.
More particularly, the founders did not fully appreciate the dis-
tinctions among manufacturing defects, design defects, and defective
warnings that would become the centerpiece of modern law. Section
402A represented only a limited change in the law because the foun-
ders intended the Section's strict liability standard, with minor excep-
tions, to apply only to what we now call manufacturing defect cases.
Section 402A and its Comments were drafted with little more than
manufacturing defect cases in mind. There was unanimous agreement
among the founders that design defect cases were to be controlled by
traditional negligence law and that warning and instruction cases
were to be controlled by a negligence approach.
This reinterpretation brings sense to what have otherwise been
very puzzling (and, as I have argued elsewhere, damaging4 ) features
of Section 402A and its Comments. Comment n rejecting the defense
of contributory negligence, for example, and Comment j dealing with
warnings and instructions have never been fully comprehensible and
have been largely ignored even by strong defenders of modern strict
liability.' As we shall see, once the original intent of the founders is
located, these Comments take on radically different meanings from
those commonly given to them today.
It is an implication of this interpretation of Section 402A that the
great expansion of products liability law and of modern tort law more
generally occurred after, rather than upon, the adoption of Section
3* E.g., Prosser, The Assault upon the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 69 Yale
L.J. 1099 (1960).
4 See Priest, Modern Tort Law and Its Reform, 22 Val. U.L. Rev. 1 (1987).
5 See Landes & Posner, A Positive Economic Analysis of Products Liability, 14 J. Legal
Stud. 535 (1985).
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402A. In my view, the vast expansion of modern law occurred as
courts attempted to apply strict liability concepts to design and warn-
ing defect cases in the years following 1965. Since the founders had
not anticipated these applications, the interpretive guideposts in Sec-
tion 402A's Comments proved in many instances unhelpful and in
important other instances misleading. It is my view that the Com-
ments contributed substantially to the expansion of liability, but in a
way largely unintended by the founders. Indeed, it is a further impli-
cation of this history of Section 402A that the vast expansion of mod-
ern tort law since 1965 is at base inconsistent with the intent of the
founders. In my view, if modern interpretations and applications of
strict liability had been put to the founders in 1964, each of the foun-
ders, except for Fleming James, would have vigorously opposed them.
Fleming James would have viewed our modern approach as a tri-
umph, but a triumph far beyond any realistic hope that he might have
had in 1965.
The description of these events should be'useful not only for the
understanding of how subsequent doctrinal changes occurred, but
more importantly for the evaluation of the current vitality of Section
402A and its Comments. The vague and uninformed groping of mod-
ern courts toward the development of cost-benefit or risk-utility stan-
dards for design defect cases can be better understood when the
limited scope that the founders intended for Section 402A strict liabil-
ity is kept in mind. This demonstration may also be useful for the
application of strict liability in new contexts. Recently, for example,
the Council of the European Community has issued a Directive on
strict products liability.6 It is likely that, as the members of the Com-
munity look to adopt the strict liability standard, they will look to the
Restatement's Section 402A and to its Comments. To these readers,
it will be instructive what the founders did and did not hope to
achieve.
Part I describes the contract and negligence law in effect before
1960 that the founders aspired to overturn. Part I also explains why
the founders regarded their objective (correctly) to be modest, and
why there was little criticism that this change in the law was accom-
plished by a set of lawyers and, more narrowly, by law teachers,
rather than by more democratic lawmaking bodies. Part II then looks
at Section 402A and its Comments more carefully to define the foun-
ders' intent. Finally, Part III briefly sketches the development of
products liability law after the adoption of Section 402A and tries to
6 Directive on the Approximation of the Laws, Regulations and Administrative Provi-
sions of the Member States Concerning Liability for Defective Products, [1985] O.J. L210/29.
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explain why the founders' original intent for the Section has had so
little influence.
I. PRODUCT DEFECT LAW IN THE 1950s AND WHY THE
FOUNDERS OBJECTED TO IT
A. Existing Law
Section 402A was designed to correct deficiencies in the rights of
action available to consumers suffering personal injury as a conse-
quence of defective products. Before 1965, consumer rights of recov-
ery were defined by warranty law and, to a substantially lesser extent,
by negligence law. There were significant differences in rights of re-
covery across the jurisdictions. In all jurisdictions, however, a con-
sumer could recover if in privity of contract and if the injury could be
attributed to a breach of an express warranty or of the implied war-
ranty of merchantability.7
. Typically, these legal requirements limited injured consumers to
suits against retailers under the implied warranty of merchantability.
Consumer suits against manufacturers were constrained either be-
cause the consumer was not in privity with the manufacturer or be-
cause the manufacturer's express warranty (the existence of which
was typically sufficient to create privity) explicitly excluded coverage
of consequential personal injury damages. The privity requirement
was easily satisfied in suits against retailers, but, of course, only by
those injured consumers who had actually purchased the product.
Retailers, however, seldom extend express warranties. Thus, against
retailers, it was typically necessary for consumers to invoke the im-
plied warranty of merchantability. The implied warranty allowed re-
covery, quite routinely, because a product causing personal injury was
easily seen to violate the requirement that it be "reasonably fit" for
the buyer's purpose or "of a merchantable quality." '8
Even when these legal requirements were satisfied, however, it
was necessary for the consumer to have given notice of the breach of
contract to the seller within a reasonable time and to have carefully
elected among available contract remedies. Generally, any complaint
to the seller would satisfy the notice requirement, although many
courts refused to regard a lawsuit as adequate notice; that is, it was
necessary for the consumer to have made some intermediate commu-
nication with the defendant-seller prior to suit.9 In addition, to re-
7 Uniform Sales Act §§ 12, 15 (1906).
§ Id. §§ 15(1)-(2).
9 This requirement was retained in the Uniform Commercial Code and only relaxed by
judicial decision in the mid-1970s.
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cover damages for personal injury, the consumer-plaintiff must have
complied with Section 69 of the Uniform Sales Act requiring election
of remedies. Section 69 was designed to prevent duplicative recov-
eries in more complex contractual contexts. It was drafted to require
complainants to elect from among remedies that rescinded the con-
tract, seeking to return the victim to the position occupied prior to the
contract; remedies that affirmed the contract, seeking specific per-
formance; and remedies that affirmed the contract, seeking damages
for unfulfilled performance. Thus, Section 69 limited a consumer to
either return of the product price (rescission of the contract), replace-
ment of the product (specific contract performance), or consequential
damages for contract breach.' 0 As a consequence, in concept, if the
injured consumer upon complaint had been given money back or had
been given a new, nondamaged model of the product, or was found to
have "elected" either of these remedies in the initial complaint, he or
she was barred from any recovery for personal injury regardless of the
seriousness of injury.
These legal provisions defined the easy cases for consumer recov-
ery. There were other grounds that could be pursued where warranty
law was unavailable. Many jurisdictions, for example, allowed recov-
ery in contract law against manufacturers based upon representations
in manufacturer product advertisements." Here, again, the notice
and election requirements needed to be satisfied. Moreoi'er, there re-
mained substantial difficulties in obtaining a recovery on this legal
theory because it was necessary for consumers to prove that they had
relied on the advertisement for the product purchase and because the
typical manufacturer's advertisement was seldom more specific than
the assurance presumed by the implied warranty of merchantability.' 2
Many other jurisdictions also allowed consumer recovery against
manufacturers on negligence grounds. The negligence theory was not
generally available because of the privity of contract bar. Many juris-
dictions, however, permitted negligence actions despite the absence of
privity in specific types of cases, most commonly where the product
could be defined as "imminently dangerous,"' 3 or in cases involving
spoiled foodstuffs. Some courts had extended the foodstuff exception
to products loosely described as "products for intimate bodily use."
In fact, this description was contrived by academics pressing for the
10 Unless, of course, such damages were excluded by warranty.
'' See Baxter v. Ford Motor Co., 168 Wash. 456, 12 P.2d 409 (1932).
12 Baxter, for example, was an exception because the advertisement specifically stated that
an automobile's windshield glass, which subsequently shattered, was shatterproof. Id. at 459-
60, 12 P.2d at 411.
13 MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916).
2306 [Vol. 10:2301
HeinOnline -- 10 Cardozo L. Rev.  2306 1988-1989
STRICT PRODUCTS LIABILITY
extension of the rule. "4 The actual case law was a hodgepodge of idio-
syncratic exceptions for hair-dyes, scalp treatments, skin formulas
and the like, and some pharmaceuticals.' 5 "Intimate bodily use" was
a plausible fact-based link among these cases and, of course, was sug-
gestive of the food cases in which bodily intimacy was a literal de-
scription of the problem. Some courts also had extended negligence
liability through expansion of the res ipsa loquitur doctrine,'
6
although there remained substantial evidentiary limitations to con-
sumer success employing res ipsa.
B. The Founders' Objections
The simple desire of the founders was to ease consumer recovery
in cases in which consumers had suffered personal injury from prod-
ucts which obviously had been mismanufactured. The founders
wanted to make recovery in these cases automatic. In an earlier pa-
per, I suggested that the rejection of contract law remedies and the
expansion of strict tort liability derived from the influence of theories
of risk distribution, accident reduction, and cost internalization.' 7
But further study reveals that these theories became influential only
some years later, as I shall attempt to explain. Several very influential
scholars advocated the broad expansion of tort law on these grounds:
Fleming James, Albert Ehrenzweig, and Robert Morris, in particu-
lar. 8 But these scholars remained on the edge of policy-making
throughout the Restatement process. More central figures in the Re-
statement process occasionally alluded to risk distribution as grounds
for extending liability,' 9 but the arguments were most often simply
additional points and seldom at the heart of the analysis.2 °
The more important figures in the Restatement-William Pros-
ser, Page Keeton, Wex Malone, Dix Noel, and some others-had
more simple objections to modern law. The concern of these scholars
14 I believe that the characterization was invented by Prosser. See Prosser, supra note 3, at
1111-12.
15 For a review of the case law, see Priest, supra note 2.
16 Kalven, Torts: The Quest for Appropriate- Standards, 53 Calif. L. Rev. 189 (1965) (re-
viewing California case law).
17 See Priest, supra note-2vat'463.
18 See F. Harper-& F. James, The Law of Torts (1956) (in 3 vols.); Ehrenzweig, supra note
2; Mors, Etfterprise Liability and the Actuarial Process-The Insignificance of Foresight, 70
YaleL.J. 554 (1961).
19 E.g., Keeton, Products Liability-Liability Without Fault and the Requirement of a
Defect, 41 Tex. L. Rev. 855 (1963); Noel, Manufacturer's Negligence of Design or Directions
for Use of a Product, 71 Yale L.J. 816 (1962).
20 Note that none besides James, Ehrenzweig, and Morris ever recommended extending
liability more broadly towards a general compensation system which, of course, is the logical
consequence of the superior risk bearing standard.
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was a set of cases-not insignificant in number-in which consumers
deserved automatic recovery for personal injury. For these cases, the
warranty defenses of privity, notice, and election of remedies as well
as the reliance requirement of the advertising theory and the various
limitations on negligence recovery all were inapposite and
counterproductive.
The cases for which the founders believed consumers deserved
automatic recovery are what we now call manufacturing or produc-
tion defect cases in which the injury to the consumer was caused by a
deviation from the manufacturer's own standards of production or
quality control. We shall see in a moment that the Restatement and
its Comments make sole reference to manufacturing defect cases. But
there is abundant evidence of the founders' focus on manufacturing
defects both in their contemporaneous writings explicating and justi-
fying Section 402A and in their writings of the preceding decade as
they argued that the warranty and negligence limitations on recovery
in manufacturing defect cases needed to be changed.
At least by the first of the 1960s, the founders agreed upon the
goal of introducing the strict liability standard for product defects.2 '
They sought to implement this objective through the American Law
Institute's project for the second Restatement of Torts. William Pros-
ser was the Reporter for the second Restatement and was joined as
principal advisers by Wex Malone, Page Keeton, Clarence Morris,
Fleming James, Roger Traynor and, later, John Wade.
The history of the progression of successive drafts of Section
402A through the Restatement process is well-known. 22 Each of the
drafts attached strict liability23 to, respectively, "food for human con-
sumption" (1961 Draft); "food for human consumption or. other
products for intimate bodily use" (1962 Draft); and "any product"
(1964, Final Draft); where such products are both "defective and un-
reasonably dangerous. '24 The founders coordinated their advocacy
within the American Law Institute itself with a series of publications
defending the approach. The principal task was to explain why the
strict liability standard was justified in contexts of defective products
21 Prosser had adopted this goal much earlier, at least by 1941. See W. Prosser, Handbook
of the Law of Torts 692 (1941). For a discussion of the development of Prosser's views, see
Priest, supra note 2, at 516-17.
22 For a recounting, see Priest, supra note 2.
23 Liability though "the seller has exercised all possible care." See Restatement (Second)
of Torts § 402A (Tent. Draft No. 6, 1961); id. (Tent. Draft No. 7, 1962); and id. (Tent. Draft
No. 10, 1964).
24 See sources cited supra note 23.
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and what the term "defect" was to mean.25
Prosser's important article "Assault upon the Citadel" in 1960
presented an outline of the approach. 26 According to Prosser, a stan-
dard of strict liability for defective products simply introduced into
law what had become the factual prerequisite for all negligence trials
involving product injuries. In a negligence trial, Prosser asserted, the
plaintiff must prove two points: first, "that his injury has been caused
by a defect in the product"; and second, "that the defect existed when
the product left the hands of the defendant. ' 27 The strict liability
standard that Prosser was proposing only acknowledged more explic-
itly what was a reality at trial. As a consequence, Prosser believed, a
standard of strict liability for product defects would introduce very
little change in the law. Indeed, Prosser claimed that strict defect
liability was essentially the equivalent of negligence: "an honest esti-
mate might very well be that there is not one case in a hundred in
which strict liability would result in recovery where negligence does
not."'28 As we shall see, the principal difference Prosser sought to
achieve through strict liability was the defeat of the various warranty
defenses described above.
Throughout his writings, Prosser simply presumed that the defi-
nition of "defect" was uncontroversial; he never discussed the concept
at any length.29 His subordinates, however, thought it necessary to
explicate the concept. Page Keeton, in a series of overlapping articles
written during the progression of Restatement drafts, explained what
the defect requirement was meant to achieve. In a 1961 article, writ-
ten before the first Restatement draft, Keeton reviewed and criticized
the various defenses in product injury cases. Keeton praised the ex-
pansion of the implied warranties to provide automatic plaintiff recov-
ery and suggested other ways that the various contract and negligence
defenses could be overcome.3°
In articles published in 1963, after the Section 402A drafting pro-
cess had commenced, Keeton focused on the defect issue itself. In an
article published in the Virginia Law Review, Keeton reviewed the
expansion of res ipsa loquitur as the most promising approach toward
establishing a manufacturer's negligence. Keeton concluded with a
25 As we shall see, and as is well-known, the "unreasonably dangerous" requirement was
meant to limit the extent of strict liability.
26 Prosser, supra note 3.
27 Id. at 1114.
28 Id.
29 But see infra text accompanying notes 71-80, where Prosser's interpretation of "defect"
can be inferred from the examples that he chose in the Comments to Section 402A.
30 Keeton, Products Liability-Current Developments, 40 Tex. L. Rev: 193 (1961).
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repetition of Prosser's point: The most effective way to establish a
seller's negligence was to show that the product was defective. Thus,
if the standard for recovery were shifted from negligence to the exist-
ence of a defect itself, the plaintiff's burden would be reduced because
the various defenses (which he had reviewed in 1961) would no longer
prevent recovery.3
In a second article published in 1963, Keeton focused more care-
fully on the defect standard in a defense of the then-current 1962 draft
of Section 402A which extended strict liability to food products and
products for intimate bodily use.32 Keeton argued that it must be
recognized that no product is ever totally safe. As a consequence, if
courts were to eliminate negligence and impose strict liability as pro-
posed by the draft Section, it would be necessary to adopt some "de-
limiting principle" 33 as a substitute for negligence. The delimiting
principle chosen in the Restatement is the requirement of proving that
the product was defective.
According to Keeton, there are two fundamental types of prod-
uct defects. The first is where the plaintiff's injury results from an
"ingredient or condition of the product" of which the manufacturer
was unaware at the time of sale. "[Iln this situation the product was
different from products of like kind. There was a miscarriage in the
manufacturing process .... [or] something deleterious in the product
.... " (citing spoiled foodstuff cases)." Defects of this nature, of
course, are now known as manufacturing defects.
The second fundamental category, according to Keeton, consists
of defects which the manufacturer knows about at the time of sale.
Keeton, however, is not referring to what we now call design defects.
Keeton describes as examples of this second category products like
cigarettes or cosmetics or pharmaceuticals, in which it is known that
the product contains ingredients that will harm some set of consum-
ers, but products whose harmful ingredients cannot be eliminated.
Here Keeton is referring to what have come to be known as unavoid-
ably unsafe products. Keeton presents as examples drugs or cosmet-
ics that are safe and effective for most users, but harmful to some
small set with allergies or particular sensitivities to some of the prod-
uct's ingredients.35
31 Keeton, Products Liability-Proof of the Manufacturer's Negligence, 49 Va. L. Rev.
675 (1963).
* 32 Keeton, Products Liability-Liability Without Fault and the Requirement of a Defect,
41 Tex. L. Rev. 855 (1963).
33 Id. at 858.
34 Id. at 859.
35 Id. at 863-68.
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According to Keeton, strict liability is only appropriate for the
first category of defects (manufacturing defects). 36 Keeton's discus-
sion of the second defect category (unavoidably unsafe products) con-
sists of a review of the cigarette litigation, showing that there had
been no cases in which cigarette manufacturers had been held liable-
to him, for good reason: the risks of cigarette use were as well-known
to the user as to the manufacturer.3 7 Keeton does cite some cosmetic
cases in which manufacturers had been held liable for allergic reac-
tions, but only where "an appreciable number," as opposed to a small
minority, of consumers had suffered the reaction.38 Cases involving
defects of this nature, Keeton concludes, must be governed by a negli-
gence or fault standard. The number of individuals affected is a mea-
sure of the manufacturer's fault. The issue in such cases is whether
the number of individuals adversely affected by the product is suffi-
cient to regard the product as "unreasonably dangerous," the second
of Section 402A's requirements.39
Of the advisers to the Restatement project, Keeton's was the
most explicit discussion of Section 402A's defect requirement. It is
very clear from his approach that the founder's conception of the de-
fect standard was far different than the conception that prevails today.
There was no thought at the time that the strict liability standard
might apply to what we now call design defects. Indeed, Keeton in
1963 did not recognize design defects as a separate defect category.
This should not suggest that the problem of design-related prod-
uct injuries was unknown to scholars of the time. Rather, from my
research, it was the unanimous view that design problems should be
governed by the negligence standard. Fleming James' 1955 survey of
products liability, though tentatively suggesting movement toward
strict liability, discussed design questions solely in terms of negli-
gence.4° More significant, Dix Noel, who concentrated his work in
the field on the design problem, wrote three articles between 1962 and
36 Id. at 858-61.
37 Id. at 868-72.
38 Id. at 863-68.
39 See id. at 871-72.
40 James, Products Liability (pt. 1), 34 Tex. L. Rev. 44 (1955) [hereinafter James, pt. 1];
James, Products Liability (pt. 2), 34 Tex. L. Rev. 192 (1955) [hereinafter James, pt. 2]. Com-
pare James, pt. 1, supra, at 50-55 (manufacturer must use reasonable care and skill in design-
ing product; must make product safe for "foreseeably probable" uses; and must consider the
obviousness of danger and the likelihood it will be appreciated when taking precautionary
measures) with id. at 66-68 (The expense of weeding out a defect may be unreasonable in
relation to the threat. In deciding whether to weed out design defects, manufacturers should
consider the obviousness of the danger, the necessity and adequacy of warning or other precau-
tions, the degree of danger the defect poses, and the possible reliance of the manufacturer. on a
later handler to weed out the defect.). This paper, however, was written to become part of the
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1966 on product design and in each presumed that the negligence
standard was the most appropriate way of considering the design
issue.
Noel's 1962 article in the Yale Law Journal was published at the
midpoint of the Restatement process.4' Noel distinguishes four types
of design failures that could lead to consumer injury: concealed dan-
gers (giving as an example an aluminum lounge chair with a hinge
that amputates a consumer's finger); the failure to provide available
safety devices; defective composition (for example in the choice of
materials for an alloy); and, later, failure to provide adequate warn-
ings or instructions.42 According to Noel, the legal question appro-
priate for each of these design categories is whether the design made
the product unreasonably dangerous. The court must look to the
knowledge of the manufacturer at the time of production, the alterna-
tive design methods available, and the quantum of danger, all consid-
erations traditional to negligence.
At the end of the article, Noel reviews the potential application
to design cases of Section 402A's strict liability standard-then pro-
posed only for defectively prepared food.43 What he sees are largely
problems. He sarcastically asks whether the strict liability standard
could be invoked against cigarette manufacturers for defective ciga-
rette design. The tone of the rhetorical question is so incredulous that
the question is not worth an answer.44 He then puts an example of an
airplane, designed by the best experts available, which after deploy-
ment develops unsuspected tensions which cause a wing to be torn off.
He presumes that a simplistic reading of the Restatement's strict lia-
bility standard could regard the plane's design as defective and unrea-
sonably dangerous. But, again, he is incredulous of the result, arguing
"it is not clear that passengers in such a plane.., should reasonably
expect that it will be free even from flaws not yet discovered by any of
the leading experts in the field." '45 Noel questions whether strict lia-
bility is a useful way of resolving design defect cases, concluding that
negligence principles including contributory negligence-though at
odds with the strict liability approach-must continue to be
Harper-James treatise. For a discussion of James's more conservative ambitions for the trea-
tise, see Priest, supra note 2, at 500-02.
41 Noel, Manufacturer's Negligence of Design or Directions for Use of a Product, 71 Yale
L.J. 816 (1962).
42 Id.
43 Id. at 877.
44 Id.
45 Id. Noel adds offhandedly that "[p]erhaps liability even in this situation would be a
useful means of spreading the loss." But Noel doubts the utility of the loss-spreading policy:
"that holding might unduly discourage the development of useful new products." Id.
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dominant.46
Despite the extension in fact of strict liability in succeeding
years-first to products for intimate bodily use and then to all prod-
ucts-Noel continued to insist on negligence as the appropriate stan-
dard for design-related injuries. In a 1965 article in an important
Southwestern Law Journal symposium on products liability, Noel
again describes strict liability as applicable solely to manufacturing
defect cases.47 Even later in 1966, after the successful adoption of
Section 402A, Noel again presumes that the negligence standard con-
trols design problems.48
Noel's presumption that strict liability applies only to manufac-
turing defects and not to design-related defects was not unique. Each
of the central figures of the Restatement project seems to have shared
this view. John Wade, for example, whose work in later years would
become influential in the design defect field, initially, at the origin of
Section 402A, defined "defect" as manufacturing defect. In the 1965
Southwestern symposium, papers of which were presented just prior
to the ALI's final adoption of Section 402A, Wade describes the de-
fect requirement in terms identical to those of Page Keeton, discussed
above.4 9 A defect under Section 402A, according to Wade, is "a mis-
take in the manufacturing process, for example, the product was
adulterated or one of its parts was broken or weakened or not prop-
erly attached."50 Strict liability can be defended, Wade argues, be-
cause for products of this nature, "there is no need of proving fault in
[the manufacturer's] letting it come to be in that condition.'""
Like Keeton, Wade believes that more difficult problems arise
where the product does not deviate from the manufacturer's specifica-
tions or quality standards, but still proves to be dangerous-that is,
where the product is unavoidably dangerous or incorporates a danger-
ous design. Again, to Wade, the question in these cases is whether the
46 Id. at 877-78. There is a hint in Noel's article of criticism of strict liability on any terms
and of resentment of the Restatement group. Noel was not an Adviser to the Restatement on
Section 402A. But see Prosser's heavy reliance in his advocacy of Section 402A on General
Motors Corp. v. Dodson, 47 Tenn. App. 438, 338 S.W.2d 655 (1960), which Noel's work had
inspired. For a discussion of this point, see Priest, supra note 2, at 515.
47 Noel, Recent Trends in Manufacturers' Negligence as to Design, Instructions or Warn-
ings, 19 Sw. L.J. 43, 44 (1965). Note that this is-the same symposium at which Wade, also
concluding that strict liability applies only to manufacturing defects, presented his first articu-
lation of the risk-utility test appropriate for design defects. See infra text accompanying notes
93-94.
48 Noel, Manufacturers' Liability for Negligence, 33 Tenn. L. Rev. 444 (1966).
49 Wade, Strict Tort Liability of Manufacturers, 19 Sw. L.J. 5 (1965).
50 Id. at 14.
51 Id.
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product is "unreasonably" dangerous. Wade concedes that the term
"defect" could be defined to embrace such cases.12 But he claims that
the effort to do so is likely to prove misleading.13 The central issue
according to Wade is one of the manufacturer's conduct: did the man-
ufacturer act reasonably in putting the product on the market? "This,
it would seem, is another way of posing the question of whether the
product is reasonably safe or not. And it may well be the most useful
way of presenting it."'54 Wade directly responds to the allegation that
in cases of this nature strict liability has no meaning independent of
negligence. "It may be argued that this is simply a test of negligence.
Exactly.""
Roger Traynor also shared the view that strict liability in Section
402A was only applicable to manufacturing defects. Traynor's opin-
ion on this issue has been misunderstood, in part because the first
legitimate strict liability case, Greenman v. Yuba Power Products,
Inc. 56 would be classified today as a design defect case and, in part
because Traynor was one of the first to seriously consider the difficult
questions involved in extending strict liability to design defects, as I
shall discuss below. But there is no doubt that Traynor was thinking
of manufacturing defect cases when he articulated the strict liability
approach. In his famous 1965 article, The Ways and Meanings of De-
fective Products and Strict Liability,57 Traynor defines a "defective
product" as one which fails to match average product quality or one
which deviates from the product norm.5"
Traynor clearly has manufacturing defects in mind here. Tray-
nor continues in the article to discuss problems with the "deviation
from the norm" standard. What are these problems? According to
Traynor, the deviation from the norm standard is overly inclusive; it
goes too far.59 Again, along with Keeton and Wade, Traynor is con-
cerned that the defect rule might be applied to unavoidably unsafe
products, such as blood or pharmaceuticals. Traynor does not sug-
gest how he would approach such products: his article was meant to
be provoking; he raises a series of difficult problems, but provides no
answers to them. (Of course, Traynor was a sitting judge at the time.)
52 Id. at 15 & n. 53.
53 Id.
54 Id. at 15.
55 Id.
56 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1963).
57 Traynor, The Ways and Meanings of Defective Products and Strict Liability, 32 Tenn.
L. Rev. 363 (1965).
58 Id. at 367.
59 Id. at 367-68.
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But it is clear that he does not regard simple strict liability for defec-
tive products as an answer. Strict liability resolves only the less com-
plex questions raised by manufacturing defects. And interestingly,
Traynor describes Greenman as a manufacturing defect case.'
In retrospect, the founders' commitment to strict liability for
only manufacturing and not for design defect cases should not be sur-
prising. Recall the importance to the founders of the food cases as
precedents for the application of strict liability. The food cases, of
course, are quintessential examples of manufacturing defect cases.
The issue in the food cases is whether some unexpected and harmful
ingredient was mistakenly introduced into the food product or
whether the processor's quality control efforts failed to detect spoil-
age. There is never an issue of defective recipe. Strict liability for
food cases has nothing to do with design.
If the ambition of the founders were no more than strict liability
for manufacturing defects, it becomes easier to understand the nature
of the founders' objections to existing warranty and negligence law. It
is also easier to comprehend why the founders thought it was per-
fectly appropriate to accomplish the change in the law by the Restate-
ment process, rather than through more democratically legitimate
legislation.
The founders objected to the warranty and tort law limitations
on consumer recoveries because, in the context of manufacturing de-
fect cases, each of the limitations seemed to operate as a legal techni-
cality, without purpose and indifferent to the underlying merits of the
claim. The arguments raised here are now familiar. Where a product
because of mismanufacture has injured someone, why should it mat-
ter whether the injured person had personally paid the money for the
product to become in privity of contract with the seller?6' As long as
statutes of limitations had not run, why should it matter whether the
consumer had delivered some intermediate notice of breach?62 Simi-
larly, the potential injustice from the operation of the election of rem-
edies section was obvious. The most telling example was one in which
a seriously injured consumer had accepted a replacement product or a
refund of the purchase price. Despite the consumer's independent
personal injury, the election requirement might bar recovery.
60 Id. at 367. Note that Traynor's description of Greenman has been ignored in the expan-
sion of strict liability. Greenman itself refers to the application of strict liability for defects "in
design and manufacture." 59 Cal. 2d at 64, 377 P.2d at 901, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 701. Even
Traynor did not address this discrepancy in description, again in my view, because none of the
founders at the time had focused clearly on design problems as "defects."
61 James, pt. 2, supra note 40, at 193.
62 Id. at 206.
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The other grounds for limitation on recovery were no better.
Again, where a manufacturing defect had injured a consumer, why
should the victim be forced to parse the manufacturer's advertising
copy and, in addition, prove that he or she had specifically relied on
the advertisement in purchasing the product?6 3 Similarly, why distin-
guish between "imminently dangerous" products and others, where
the product had deviated from the manufacturer's own standards.'
Where the source of the injury is a deviation from the manufac-
turer's own manufacturing and design standards, the various limita-
tions on consumer recovery are very difficult to defend. They operate
solely as legal technicalities defeating the just expectations of every
party to the transaction. If the manufacturer must concede that the
injury-causing product was defective because it deviated from internal
standards, how can one justify invocation of the privity defense, the
notice of breach defense, or the election of remedies defense? Why
should only manufacturers of foodstuffs and hair-dyes bear special
responsibilities?
65
The various defenses can be easily justified in other contract and
tort contexts. The privity of contract rule, for example, makes good
sense in contexts involving explicit negotiation over contractual re-
sponsibilities at the various stages of transfer from manufacture to
sale of the finished product.66 But there is little explicit negotiation in
the context of the typical consumer purchase. 67 Similarly, the re-
quirement that the complaining party give notification of a claim of
contract breach is a useful rule both where the contract provides for
continuing performance over time and where it is possible for the per-
forming party to mitigate loss from the breach by cure or otherwise.
But, again, where a consumer has suffered personal injury from a
manufacturing defect, the independent notice requirement has no
function whatsoever. The advertising reliance requirement and the
various limitations of negligence recovery make just as little sense for
manufacturing defect cases. In the context of manufacturing defects
63 Id. at 196.
64 Id. at 227.
65 See James, General Products-Should Manufacturers Be Liable Without Negligence? 24
Tenn. L. Rev. 923, 926 (1957).
66 Winterbottom v. Wright, 152 Eng. Rep. 402 (1842), is a perfect example: the legal obli-
gations of the postmaster, the employee and the manufacturer had all been negotiated sepa-
rately. For a further discussion see Epstein, Products Liability as an Insurance Market, 14 J.
Legal Stud. 645 (1985).
67 This of course was the point made vividly in Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32
N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960) (in my view, too vividly, see Priest, A Theory of the Consumer
Product Warranty, 90 Yale L.J. 1297 (1981)).
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these various defenses are not justified by the most basic concepts of
contract and tort law.
It should be emphasized that these objections to the various de-
fenses to consumer recovery were unrelated to concerns about the em-
pirical dimension of the problem. The election requirement of Section
69, for example, may have influenced pleadings, but there was never
an empirical demonstration that the Section had been strictly inter-
preted to substantially defeat consumer recoveries. Similarly, the no-
tice requirement seems egregious on paper in manufacturing defect
cases. But it is difficult to find cases in which it was actually invoked
to prevent consumer recovery. The reliance requirement regarding
advertising and the various limitations on negligence recovery were,
perhaps, more significant. But none of the founders ever believed that
the problem of consumer product injuries was a significant one for
society. Recall Prosser's estimate that only one in a hundred case
outcomes would change.68 In contrast to automobile or workplace
injuries, consumer product-related injuries represented a minor field.
Correcting and revising the law for 'the field constituted a technical
improvement in the law, rather than an important advance in social
justice.
The founders' intent, thus, was largely to clean up an area of law
for which the more general rules of contract and tort did not quite fit.
Changing the grounds for recovery for injuries caused by manufactur-
ing defects was a reform that could command-as it did-widespread
support. The reform generated little objection and no principled ob-
jection.69 Indeed, because the Restatement project sought no more
than to correct a set of technical flaws in the law, it could be imple-
mented directly by lawyers. There was no need to consult with the
interest groups affected,70 whether manufacturers or consumers, or to
seek legislative authorization for the change.
II. SECTION 402A AND ITS COMMENTS OBSERVED
This Part looks directly to the text of Section 402A and its Com-
ments to infer what the founders intended for strict liability. In my
view, the Section and its Comments make very clear that the strict
68 Prosser may well have been exaggerating. For a description of Prosser's "empirical flex-
ibility" in his advocacy of strict liability, see Priest, supra note 2, at 516-18.
69 Manufacturing interests never seriously objected to the change in the law. See id. at
517-18.
70 At the 1962 Meetings of the American Law Institute, the members entertained a state-
ment by the pharmaceutical industry regarding strict liability for drugs, but without serious
discussion. There were no industry presentations the next year when the Institute considered
extending the strict liability standard to all products.
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liability standard was to apply chiefly to manufacturing defects.7'
The text of the Comments strongly supports that interpretation.
More significant, in the many illustrations of how strict liability is to
be applied, there is not a single clear example of application of strict
liability to design defects. There are many additional passages which,
concededly, are susceptible to more expansive interpretations of strict
liability. Indeed, I shall explain in the next Part how the open-ended
character of these passages has led to the vast expansion of modern
law.
Section 402A attaches strict liability to anyone who sells a prod-
uct "ina defective condition unreasonably dangerous" to user or con-
sumer. The operative definitions in the Comments of the "defective
condition" and "unreasonably dangerous" requirements mirror the
analysis of the scholarly writings of Prosser, Keeton and Wade, de-
scribed above.
The concept "defective condition" is defined in Comment g af-
firmatively and in Comment h negatively: when a product is not in
defective condition. Comment g provides that a "defective condition"
is one "not contemplated by the ultimate consumer, which will be
unreasonably dangerous to him." This definition is not sufficiently
specific to distinguish between manufacturing and design defects, a
vagueness of substantial subsequent importance, as we shall see be-
low.72 Comment h provides that a "product is not in defective condi-
tion when it is safe for normal handling and consumption," again
ambiguous as between manufacturing and design defects.
A fuller description in Comment h, however, provides more de-
tail as to the meaning of defective condition. According to Comment
h, the defective condition of a product "may arise not only from
harmful ingredients, not characteristic of the product itself, either as
to presence or quantity, but also from foreign objects contained in the
product, from decay or deterioration before sale, or from the way the
product is prepared or packed." The reference to the "quantity" of
an ingredient may possibly be interpreted to incorporate a product
whose design is defective because of excessive ingredient levels. Other
than this vague reference, however, the description can only refer to
manufacturing defects.
The unreasonably dangerous requirement is defined in Comment
i. The Comment makes quite clear-as is well-known-that the un-
reasonably dangerous requirement was meant to serve as a limitation
71 The Comments also tangentially refer to a manufacturer's obligation to provide warn-
ings. See infra text accompanying notes 85-86.
72 See infra text accompanying notes 95-97.
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on liability where a product might cause harm, but where the con-
sumer was fully aware of the product's harm-causing potential, such
as in the familiar cases of tobacco and alcohol. The conceptual basis
for the Comment was the distinction between manufacturing defects
and unavoidably dangerous products, discussed extensively by Kee-
ton, Noel, and Wade, as described above.73 The Comment, following
Keeton and Wade, states directly that strict liability was not meant to
apply to this category of defects.
Comments g, h, and i provide the only descriptions of the defect
requirement. The remaining Comments consist of elaborations of the
history of strict liability, its scope in terms of potential defendants and
plaintiffs, defenses, extensions and limitations. Though no other of
the Comments directly addresses the defect requirement, the Com-
ments together provide the strongest evidence of the founders' exclu-
sive focus on strict liability for manufacturing defects through the
illustrations that the Comments provide of how strict liability is to be
applied. The Comments present fifty-four separate examples (or sets
of examples) of the application of the types of cases to which the strict
liability standard was meant to apply. Six of the fifty-four examples
are unclear as to the character of the defect, most commonly, because
the example's point is to illustrate that the scope of strict liability ex-
tends both to users and bystanders and against all levels of sellers. Of
the remaining forty-eight examples, eleven illustrate unavoidably un-
safe products, exempted from strict liability. And of the thirty-seven
examples that remain, five represent exceptions which prove that
strict liability applies to manufacturing defects and the remaining
thirty-two are each applications of strict liability in manufacturing de-
fect contexts. The strongest evidence that the founders focused exclu-
sively on strict liability for manufacturing defects is that they did not
present a single example in the Comments of an alternative strict lia-
bility application.74
I present below the examples of the application of strict liability
presented in the Comments to Section 402A. In some instances I
have grouped together string examples or sets of similar illustrations.
Those examples unclear as to the character of the defect are marked
separately.
73 See supra text accompanying notes 36-40 (Keeton), 43-47 (Noel), 52-56 (Wade).
74 I discuss the founders' approach toward warnings infra text accompanying notes 85-86.
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Comment e: Not raw materials:
Comment f: Seller:
Comment g: Defective condition:
Comment h: Exception to defect:
but strict liability applies to:
Comment i: Unreasonably dangerous






















bottled beverage broken against
radiator,






carbonated beverage with weak




castor oil in Mussolini torture
good whisky




bad butter contaminated with fish
oil
75 See Spence v. Three Rivers Builders & Masonry Supply, Inc., 353 Mich. 120, 90 N.W.2d
873 (1958) (bad cinderblock lot).
76 Note that the source of the weakness in the bottle is not improper bottle design.
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Comment j: Directions:
exception to common allergies:










applies to impure ingredients in drugs




various products to show scope
(unclear),
pebble in can of beans77
Comment m: Warranty (rejecting theory):
food ("consumption")
Comment o: Non-users:





coffee beans contaminated with
arsenic,
auto steering gear (unclear)





The unanimity of approach of these multiple examples demon-
strates again the narrow focus of the founders. It is clear that the
founders chiefly intended strict liability to apply to manufacturing de-
fect cases. This implication is bolstered by an earlier finding that of
the forty cases that Prosser cited in the Appendix to Section 402A to
support his claim that the various state courts were increasingly
adopting strict liability, all but two were clearly manufacturing defect
77 Contrast with Fleming James, who in urging the expansion of strict liability to
incorporate design defects (among others) argued, "Surely greater danger lurks in a defective
automobile wheel than in a pebble in a can of beans," James, General Products-Should
Manufacturers Be Liable Without Negligence?, 24 Tenn. L. Rev. 923, 926 (1957).
78 See Goldberg v. Kollsman Instrument Co., 12 N.Y.2d 342, 191 N.E.2d 81, 240
N.Y.S.2d 592 (1963) (manufacturing defect).
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cases.7 9 The novelty of the cases to Prosser was, most frequently,
their relaxation of the privity of contract rule. Moreover, of the eight
cases in which courts had adopted standards most closely resembling
strict liability (thus, the cases on which Prosser most heavily relied),"°
all were manufacturing defect cases.
The Comments to Section 402A assume a new meaning when
read from the manufacturing defect prospect. Comment n, address-
ing contributory negligence, for example, has always been difficult to
understand and justify. Comment n provides that, since the liability
of Section 402A is not based upon a seller's negligence, the con-
sumer's contributory negligence will not generally be relevant.
Contributory negligence of the plaintiff is not a defense when such
negligence consists merely in a failure to discover the defect in the
product, or to guard against the possibility of its existence. On the
other hand, the form of contributory negligence which consists in
voluntarily and unreasonably proceeding to encounter a known
danger, and commonly passes under the name of assumption of
risk, is a defense under this Section as in other cases of strict liabil-
ity. If the user or consumer discovers the defect and is aware of
the danger, and nevertheless proceeds unreasonably to make use of
the product and is injured by it, he is barred from recovery.
The denial of traditional contributory negligence in Comment n
has had two principal effects. First, it has inspired subsequent judicial
efforts to define a legal regime for strict liability that is distinctively
different than the negligence regime.8" Second, it has supported spe-
cific judicial rulings denying the relevance of consumer contributory
actions in a wide range of products liability contexts.8 2
The denial of contributory negligence is peculiar, however, be-
cause the strongest modem defense of strict liability has insisted on
the vitality of the contributory negligence defense. In recent years, a
79 Priest, supra note 2, at 514-16. I now include Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc.,
given my new reading of Justice Traynor's interpretation of the case. See supra note 60 and
accompanying text. The only clear exceptions are Beck v. Spindler, 256 Minn. 543, 99
N.W.2d 670 (1959) (defectively designed mobile trailer roof), and King v. Douglas Aircraft
Co., 159 So. 2d 108 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1963) (defectively designed combustion chamber).
Two other cases raised failure to warn issues. McQuaide v. Bridgeport Brass Co., 190 F. Supp.
252 (D. Conn. 1960); Midwest Game Co. v. M.F.A. Milling Co., 320 S.W.2d 547 (Mo. 1959).
80 See Priest, supra note 2, at 514-17.
81 I discuss and criticize this different regime in Priest, Products Liability Law and the
Accident Rate, in Liability Perspectives and Policy 184 (R. Litan & C. Winston eds. 1988)
[hereinafter Priest, Products Liability], and in Priest, Modem Tort Law and Its Reform, 22
Val. U.L. Rev. 1 (1987).
82 See, e.g., Luque v. McLean, 8 Cal. 3d 136, 501 P.2d 1163, 104 Cal. Rptr. 443 (1972),
and McCown v. Int'l Harvester Co., 463 Pa. 13, 342 A.2d 381 (1975) (both holding that
contributory negligence is not an available defense in strict liability actions).
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group of lawyer-economists, led by Professors Shavell and Landes and
Judge Posner, have trumpeted the economic efficiency of modem
strict liability. 3 The efficiency claim, however, requires not only that
contributory negligence be an available defense, but more centrally
that the consumer's contributory negligence be the effective basis for
determining liability. 4
Comment n's approach to contributory negligence, however, be-
comes plausible once it is recalled that the founders had meant strict
liability to apply chiefly to manufacturing defect cases. In the context
of a manufacturing defect, a consumer's ability to contribute to the
occurrence of an injury, is very constrained. If the consumer is una-
ware of the defect inherent in the product, there is no range for con-
tributory negligence. As directed by the Comment, only where the
consumer has become aware of the defect, yet voluntarily proceeds to
use the product, does the concept of contributory negligence have a
place. As long as strict liability is applied only in manufacturing de-
fect contexts, 85 the denial of contributory negligence makes perfect
sense, including perfect economic sense.8 6
Section 402A's Comment j dealing with warnings and instruc-
tions has also seemed peculiar. Comment j provides that, in some
cases, sellers can be required to give warnings or instructions as to
product use. Comment j has been the source of the extraordinary
explosion of defective warning law in the years following Section
402A's adoption.8 7 Yet, the illustrations to Comment j all are exam-
ples of Keeton's and Wade's second category of defects, unavoidably
dangerous products, such as products to which some set of consumers
is allergic or drugs for which some set of consumers is particularly
susceptible.
Viewed from the perspective of the Keeton and Wade writings on
this subject, Comment j represented a small step toward addressing
consumer losses which otherwise were denied under the founders'
strict liability approach. According to Comment j, though generally
free from liability without negligence, a manufacturer knowing that
83 Shavell, Strict Liability Versus Negligence, 9 J. Legal Stud. 1 (1980). Landes & Posner,
A Positive Economic Analysis of Products Liability, 14 J. Legal Stud. 535 (1985).
84 See discussion of this point in Priest, Products Liability, supra note 81.
85 Of course, there can be contexts in which a consumer's clearly contributory negligence
combines with a manufacturing defect to cause injury, for example, a defective steering column
in the hands of a reckless driver. This complication was far beyond the conception of the
founders who, as the Comments' illustrations suggest, were concerned chiefly with simpler
defects. See supra text accompanying notes 75-78. I am grateful to Gary Schwartz for this
point.
86 But see supra note 85.
87 For a brief review of this caselaw, see Priest, supra note 2, at 523-525.
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there exists some set of particularly susceptible consumers is required
to provide a warning reporting the product's ingredients.
As the writings of Keeton and Wade make clear, however, the
warning requirement placed on manufacturers was meant to be mod-
est. And Comment j closes with a paragraph that, in retrospect, em-
phasizes how modest that burden was to have been, but that in the
subsequent elaboration of strict liability has been the source of a vast
expansion in warning liability. Comment j reads: "Where warning is
given, the seller may reasonably assume that it will be read and
heeded; and a product bearing such a warning, which is safe for use if
it is followed, is not in defective condition, nor is it unreasonably
dangerous."
In years subsequent to the adoption of Section 402A, this para-
graph has been interpreted by courts to eliminate the necessity on the
part of consumers to prove causation: that the absence of a product
warning in fact caused the injury suffered by the consumer.8 8 Its orig-
inal meaning, however, is entirely different. The writings of Keeton
and Wade and Noel, from which the warning requirement derived,
show that, far from a source of expanded liability, the paragraph was
intended to constrain the manufacturer's warning duties. The para-
graph was meant to qualify the warning obligation to the bare provi-
sion of the warning in some form. The intent of the paragraph was to
suggest that the manufacturer Was not to be made liable if the con-
sumer had failed to read the warning. Nor was it necessary for the
manufacturer to devise ways to ensure that the reader would see and
appreciate the warning's contents. As long as a warning existed in
some form, the manufacturer's duties were discharged.
III. STRICT LIABILITY LED ASTRAY
As is well-known, neither strict products liability nor the exten-
sion of the strict liability approach in other legal areas has followed
the course the founders intended. Strict products liability has not
been limited to manufacturing defect cases. And the broader influ-
ence of the strict liability idea extends far beyond the limited contexts
of defensible automatic recovery that the founders thought they had
defined.
As the founders expected, the application of strict liability to
manufacturing defect cases did not signal a revolution. Prosser had
suggested that only one case out of a hundred would be decided differ-
ently; of manufacturing defect cases, he may have been accurate. It
88 See, e.g., Phillips v. Kimwood Mach. Co., 269 Or. 485, 525 P.2d 1033 (1974).
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was very quickly perceived, however, that the product defect problem
was more complicated than originally thought. Roger Traynor's 1965
article, discussed above, was suggestive of some of the problems.89
Although the principal point of the article was the reaffirmation of
strict liability for manufacturing defects, Traynor probes toward the
problem of dangerous design. He is clearly not prepared to advocate
strict liability in the design context, but he is uneasy with the lack of
an obvious analytical approach.
At roughly. the same time, Ralph Nader began his attack on de-
sign problems in American automobiles. In a 1965 article, Nader ar-
gued that legal liability should serve as a deterrent against harm-
causing manufacturer design.90 It is an important index of.the times,
however, that the liability Nader was recommending for these cases
was negligence liability. Two years later, however, Nader focused his
views. In a 1967 article with Joseph Page, Nader strongly criticized
the "deviation-from-the-norm" defect standard that Justice Traynor
had recommended in 1965, urging the application of strict liability to
design-related injuries.91
At about the same time, John Wade began to appreciate the
product design issue.92 Wade initially insisted on retaining the strict
liability standard for manufacturing defects alone.93 With respect to
other forms of defects, like design defects, Wade began to devise a
way to apply the negligence standard. Wade built from sections 291-
293 of the 1934 Restatement of Torts. These sections had been the
source of Learned Hand's famous Carroll Towing decision in which
Hand proposed a form of cost-benefit analysis for the determination
of negligence.94
Wade attempted to adapt the cost-benefit approach for the deter-
mination of negligent product design. He proposed seven factors rele-
vant to the evaluation of a manufacturer's design negligence.
Regrettably, Wade did not follow the Restatement approach with
much care. The Restatement sections had clearly indicated that the
cost-benefit calculus was to be conducted against alternative available
actions that the defendant might have taken. If Wade had appreci-
ated this point, the elements of his cost-benefit test-which he deemed
89 Traynor, supra note 57.
90 Nader, Automobile Design: Evidence Catching Up with the Law, 42 Den. L. Center J.
Incorporating Dicta 32 (1965).
91 Nader & Page, Automobile Design and the Judicial Process, 55 Calif. L. Rev. 645
(1967).
92 Wade, Strict Tort Liability of Manufacturers, 19 Sw. L.J. 5 (1965).
93 Id.
94 United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947).
1989] 2325
HeinOnline -- 10 Cardozo L. Rev.  2325 1988-1989
CARDOZO LAW REVIEW
"balancing the utility of the risk against the magnitude of the
risk"a-would have focused closely on alternative designs available
to the manufacturer. Instead, Wade more broadly incorporated ele-
ments that included the utility of the product as a whole to be
weighed against product risk. Some years later, he modified his risk-
utility test to also incorporate insurance considerations in what has
now become the dominant standard for evaluation of design defects. 96
The efforts to define a sensible strict liability standard for the
design-related injury problem proved exceptionally difficult. Many
courts, especially in the early years following adoption of the Restate-
ment, drew upon the references in Comments g and i to consumer
expectations of product dangers. The consumer expectation language
had been inserted in the Comments to reinforce the contributory neg-
ligence/assumption of risk proposition of Comment n: that the only
manufacturer defense to strict liability (again, given the expected
manufacturing defect context) was the consumer's voluntary decision
to use the product though aware of the defect. Extended as a stan-
dard of design defects, the consumer expectation language vastly in-
creased manufacturer liability, since it was a standard virtually
without content.97 Wade's risk-utility test also proved to lack specific
content. The various factors are redundant and suggest that any fact
related to the product is relevant for resolution of the design question.
Except for manufacturing defect cases, then, the legacy of the
Restatement and its Comments was uncertainty. The Comments
were read generally to deny the relevance of manufacturer defenses.
They were read to expand, rather than to constrain, manufacturer lia-
bility for defective warnings. They provided no definitive guidance as
to sensible standards for design defects.
In, my view, it was at this point, rather than earlier, that the
broader intellectual currents of risk distribution and cost internaliza-
tion that had been advocated in the academic literature for the pre-
ceding three decades began to influence the direction of the law. 98 As
I have shown elsewhere, the evolution of standards in both design and
95 Wade, supra note 90, at 17.
96 Wade, On The Nature of Strict Tort Liability for Products, 44 Miss. L.J. 825, 837-38
(1973). Wade's new set of factors continued to number seven, because he combined two of the
previous factors dealing with consumer awareness of injuries.
97 The employment of the standard is described in Priest, The Disappearance of the Con-
sumer from Modern Products Liability Law, in The Frontier of Research in the Consumer
Interest 771 (E. Maynes ed. 1988), and Priest, Products Liability Law and the Accident Rate,
in Liability Perspectives and Policy 184 (R. Litan & C. Winston eds. 1988).
98 See generally Priest, supra note 2 (discussing the evolution of enterprise liability and
stressing that the progression toward absolute liability was both foreseen and influenced by
three decades of contracts and torts literature).
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warning cases have been strongly directed by the concepts of risk dis-
tribution and cost internalization.99 The direction of this influence
has been toward absolute liability. The founders stated with great em-
phasis that the strict liability standard that they were proposing
stopped far short of absolute liability. Understood in context, I be-
lieve that the founders meant what they said. The founders failed to
understand, however, that the Restatement section and the Com-
ments that they drafted were not sufficiently specific to constrain the
influence of the ideas of risk distribution and cost internalization that
had dominated the legal landscape. The founders had attempted to
constrain strict liability even within the manufacturing defect context.
They clearly failed.
99 Id. at 519-27.
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